In reality, however, we don’t tend to start with the right question in the first place. Force structure requirements can change with different ‘demand, dependency, duration and distance.’Įccles argued that ‘no problem presents more difficulty than trying to determine in advance the most efficient balance of logistics resources and combat forces that will be needed for any campaign’. As the ADF’s deployment to East Timor described in Part Two showed, it’s very difficult to get a balance between logistics and combat forces right. In the Australian example, this ratio has featured in every review of Defence undertaken in the forty years since the ADF was formed. At times, these organisations can consider support forces as ‘non-core’ to operational outcomes. Defence organisations habitually compare combat forces to support forces. You cannot escape a discussion on logistics capability without raising the concept of the ‘tooth to tail’. These factors are as follows:īalance between logistics and combat resources and elements. Logistics readiness is therefore achieved by addressing six key factors that are applicable at all levels – from the strategic to the tactical. ![]() Logistics readiness is a function of total organisational performance and efficiency. This takes the matter well beyond basic preparedness requirements such as the identification of commonly used, but routinely compromised, preparedness metrics including ‘notices to move’ for logistics forces and capabilities. The first step towards improving logistics readiness is recognising that it is a product of routine and organisational behaviour, as much as it is about the appropriate allocation of resources to assigned strategic goals and the development of capabilities. For those that do, consider what might have happened without the attempt? Strategic responsiveness would suffer, and a slow mobilisation process to correct a lack of effort and rigour in peacetime could result. These articles might suggest to some that any attempts to devote time to addressing logistics readiness are likely to fail. Part Two offered examples where militaries get it right, and a number of examples where events did not transpire as well as they might. ![]() In Part One of this series asking the question, ‘how much readiness is enough?’ I described the interplay between logistics and readiness. When capability and attitude are misaligned, and where understanding is deficient, it is inevitable that the investment of time, effort and resources into military readiness is wasted. ![]() Moreover, the attitude of commanders and leaders, logisticians and staff planners to comprehensively and critically assess the Defence organisation – a ‘blue force analysis’ – also influences the logistics system to function as intended. However, as logistics is a comprehensive system of activities and tasks, logistics readiness can only be assured by combining effective resource use with efficient processes, good governance, well-designed organisations with articulated authorities, and a willingness to address often unglamorous issues. Preparedness metrics, strategic goal-setting and policy making also help. Of course additional funding and attention can improve the capability and capacity of any military force to sustain itself in peace and on operations. Logistics readiness is not just a matter of prioritising Defence resources. ![]() Logistics readiness refers to the ability to undertake, to build up and thereafter to sustain, combat operations at the full combat potential of forces.
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